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gramsciano (Gramsci Dictionary). There exist more than one “common senses” distinguishable by area, 
social stratum and period, continually enriched with scientific notions, and standing in-between folklore 
and the philosophy of the scholars. It is a “disorderly aggregate of philosophical conceptions” in which 
“whatever one likes” may be found. It must be subjected to critique, since it is often connotated by the 
various forms of conservatism. It is a social group’s most wide-spread and often implicit ideology, and 
dialectically related to philosophy, meaning that a social group that aligns itself with the subalterns must 
enter into a dialectical relation with common sense in a mutually transformative way. Differently from 
Bukharin’s approach, the critique of common sense, Gramsci states, must be one of the starting points for 
a compendium of Marxism: forcing the introduction of new truths into common sense is proof of its 
capacity for expansion. At stake is the transformation of the subalterns’ conception of the world, by and 
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Common Sense / Senso comune:  





The expression “common sense” appears both in the list of main 
subject matters that opens Notebook 1 and in the list found at the 
beginning of Notebook 8, linked in both cases to “folklore”. As 
early as Q1§65 Gramsci is explicit in his view that there exist more 
than one “common senses”, distinguishable according to their 
social connotation and geographical area. But he also uses the 
expression with a non-positive connotation: he writes that  
 
every social stratum has its own “common sense” which is ultimately the 
most widespread conception of life and morals [...] Common sense is not 
something rigid and static; rather, it changes continuously, enriched by 
scientific notions and philosophical opinions which have entered into common 
usage. “Common sense” is the folklore of “philosophy” and stands midway 
between real “folklore” (that is, as it is understood) and the philosophy, the 
science, the economics of the scholars. “Common sense” creates the folklore 
of the future, that is a more or less rigidified phase of a certain time and place 
(Q1§65, Gerratana, Critical Edition p. 76; PN Vol.1 p. 173).1  
 
From this passage one deduces that: a) “every social stratum has 
its own ‘common sense’” and therefore in a society there exist 
different common senses; b) common sense is defined as “the most 
widespread conception of life and morals” within a given social 
stratum; c) common sense derives from the sedimentation left 
behind by previous philosophical currents; d) common sense is in 
continuous modification (and therefore different common senses 
follow one another over time). 
Common sense appears as a variant of the concept of ideology, 
understood in Gramsci’s terms as a conception of the world. It is 
the conception of the world of a social stratum, often characterized 
 
1 References to the Notebooks followed by paragraph and page numbers are to the Critical 
Edition of the Quaderni del carcere (QdC), ed. Valentino Gerratana, Torino, Einaudi 1975. PN 
refers to the planned but now interrupted integral translation into English of the Prison 
Notebooks, ed. and trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg, New York, Columbia University Press Vol. 1 
(1992), Vol. 2 (1996) and Vol. 3 (2007). SPN refers to Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and 
trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, London, Lawrence and Wishart 1971. 




as the moment of passive reception compared to the active 
elaboration of the intellectual-leadership group of the social group 
itself. In so far as it is passive, common sense undergoes a delay 
and also elementary moments of elaboration. But the fact that 
“every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’” excludes the 
case that it may be defined as the qualitatively lowest level of a 
conception of the world. In general, what is being dealt with is the 
most widespread and often implicit ideology of a social group, of a 
minimal level. As such, common sense is related dialectically to 
philosophy, i.e. with the higher segment of ideology, belonging to 
the leading groups of the various social groups. Equally with this, a 
political force that aligns itself with the subalterns must install a 
dialectical relation with common sense, in order that common sense 
should be and is transformed, up to reaching a new common sense, 
necessary in the context of the struggle for hegemony. 
In Q3§48 of (QdC, pp. 328-32; PN Vol. 2, pp. 48-52), dedicated 
to examining the spontaneity-leadership nexus with explicit reference 
to the Ordine Nuovo group, Gramsci brings into play the importance 
of the element of popular spontaneity, albeit as an element that has 
to be educated. He writes  that at the time of Ordine Nuovo,  
 
this element of ‘spontaneity’ was not neglected, much less disdained: it was 
educated, it was given a direction, it was cleansed of everything extraneous that 
could contaminate it, in order to unify it by means of modern theory but in a 
living, historically effective manner (Q3§48, p. 330; PN Vol. 2, p. 50 or SPN p. 
198),  
 
i. e. by means of Marxism. Here, common sense is posed in relation 
with “the ‘spontaneous’ sentiments of the masses” formed precisely 
“through everyday experience in the light of ‘common sense’”. But 
above all a “‘quantitative’ difference, of degree not of quality” is 
asserted between philosophy and “common sense”, since Gramsci 
recalls that “Kant considered it important for his philosophical 
theories to be in agreement with common sense; the same is true of 
Croce” (Q3§48, p. 331; PN Vol. 2, p. 51 or SPN p. 199). 
It must not however be forgotten that for Gramsci common 
sense has precise weak points, including ones of a logical type. The 
“distortions” in its “way of thinking” have to be corrected, among 
other things because they are bound up with the “philosophy of the 
man in the street” formed by “oratory and declamation” (Q4§18, p. 




439; PN Vol. 2, p. 160). Still more negative is the judgment on 
common sense in relation to the subject of the “objective existence 
of reality” (Q4§41, pp. 466-7; PN Vol. 2, p. 189), which Gramsci 
considers “the most important question concerning science”, but 
which for common sense “does not even exist”. Such certainties 
enter into common sense “essentially [from] religion” [...] from 
Christianity” (loc. cit.). Here common sense for Gramsci is a 
backward vision of the world, both because it is conditioned by 
religious ideology, which denies immanence, and because it does 
not accept the new aspects represented by science: it is a pre-
modern view of the world. Gramsci often also connotes common 
sense with conservatism: it “is led to believe that what exists today 
has always existed” (Q6§78, p. 745; PN Vol. 3, p. 58). In the Note-
books, the mainly negative assessments and annotations regarding 
this category – often with the adjective “vulgar” appended – seem 
clearly to prevail over the positive ones. 
Gramsci criticizes Croce for “continuously flirting with the 
‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ of the people” (Q7§1, p. 853; PN 
Vol. 3, p. 156). In Notebook 8 the reflection on common sense 
undergoes its maximum expansion, taking its cue from comparing 
Bukharin’s theories with those of Croce and Gentile. We read for 
example that  
 
Croce often seems to take pleasure in the fact that certain philosophical 
propositions are shared by common sense, but what does that mean in 
concrete terms? But what can this mean concretely? In order to prove that “all 
men are philosophers” there is no need to resort to common sense in this way. 
Common sense is a disorderly aggregate of philosophical conceptions in which 
one can find whatever one likes. (Q8§173, pp. 1045-6; PN Vol. 3, pp. 334)  
 
And again, a little further on, “Gentile talks of an ahistorical 
‘human nature’, and of the ‘truth of common sense’, as if one 
couldn’t find whatever one wanted in ‘common sense’ and as if 
there were just one immutable, eternal ‘common sense’” (Q8§175, 
p. 1047; PN Vol. 3, p. 336). It seems to Gramsci that Croce and 
Gentile link up tactically and instrumentally to common sense because 
they want the subalterns to continue to remain such. In the redraft 
of the last note quoted from, Gramsci adds a consideration that 
represents a balanced equilibrium of his reasoning, starting from 
the recognition that  




what has been said [up to now] does not mean there are no truths in com-
mon sense. It means rather that common sense is an ambiguous, contradictory 
and multiform concept, and that to refer to common sense as a confirmation 
of truth is a non-sense. It is possible to state correctly that a certain truth has 
become part of common sense in order to indicate that it has spread beyond 
the confines of intellectual groups [...] because common sense is crudely 
neophobe and conservative, so that to have succeeded in forcing the intro-
duction of a new truth is a proof that the truth in question has exceptional 
evidence and capacity for expansion (Q11§13, pp. 1399-1400; SPN, p. 423). 
  
Gramsci argues that, since one can find everything there, in com-
mon sense, too, there are elements of truth. It is certainly important 
to note that a thesis has become common sense, above all for those 
who want to create a new common sense, even if common sense is 
linked to an image of an ideology of neophobia, prejudicially 
opposed to new factors and therefore conservative.  
In Q8, on the basis of his assessment of common sense, Gramsci 
engages in a sharp confrontation with Bukharin. Regarding the dia-
lectic he had already accused Bukharin’s Popular Manual2 of having 
“really capitulated before common sense and vulgar thought” 
(Q7§29, p. 877; PN Vol. 3, p. 179 or SPN p. 435). Now he adds that  
 
a work like the Popular Manual, that is aimed at a community of readers who 
are not professional intellectuals, should have as its point of departure an 
analysis and a critique of the philosophy of common sense, which is the “philo-
sophy of non-philosophers”, in other words the conception of the world 
acritically absorbed from the various social environments in which the moral 
individuality of the average person is developed. Common sense is not a single 
conception, identical in time and space. It is the “folklore” of philosophy, and 
like folklore it appears in countless forms. The fundamental characteristics of 
common sense consist in its being a disjointed, incoherent, and inconsequen-
tial conception of the world, that matches the character of the multitudes 
whose philosophy it is (Q8§173, p. 1045; PN Vol. 3, p. 333, or SPN p. 419). 
 
 Gramsci emphasizes in the first place his own definition of 
common sense as a “philosophy”, albeit “of the non-philosophers”, 
as a “conception of the world”, as the “‘folklore’ of philosophy”: an 
nth confirmation of that conceptual family in which Gramsci’s 
concept of ideology is articulated. But Gramsci adjectivizes “com-
mon sense” and the links in the conceptual chain of reference that 
 
2 N. I. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism. A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology, first 
published in English by Allen & Unwin, London 1926; more recent edition Historical 
Materialism: A System of Sociology, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1969. 




are nearest to it, yet again in an extremely critical way: “acritically 
absorbed”, syncretic, “incoherent”, “inconsequential”. Going on in 
the note, Gramsci adds that “historically, the formation of a homo-
geneous social group is accompanied by the development of a 
‘homogeneous’ – that is systematic – philosophy, in opposition to 
common sense ” (ibid.). 
What is at stake is the conception of the world of the subalterns, 
which must be transformed or replaced by launching a hegemonic 
challenge. Marx, too, who had alluded to the “fixed popular 
opinion” – Gramsci argues – implicitly asserts “the need for ‘new 
popular beliefs’, that is, for a new ‘common sense’ and thus for a 
new culture, a new philosophy” (Q8§175, p. 1047; PN Vol. 3, p. 
336)3. Ideology is a material force in given situations: one is dealing 
with the production of “a new philosophy” which, in defeating 
existing common sense, becomes a mass ideology, a new common 
sense. If the indication of the goal – overcoming common sense – 
is clear, it must not be forgotten that “the conception of the world 
that is widespread among the popular masses in a historical period” 
(Q8§213, p. 1071; PN Vol. 3, p. 360) cannot be something that is 
totally negative:  
 
It is a matter therefore of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys or 
could enjoy a certain diffusion because it is connected to and implicit in 
practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense 
possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies. But this can 
only happen if the demands of cultural contact with the ‘simple’ are continually 
felt (Q11§12, pp. 1382-3; SPN, p. 330, footnote).  
 
There returns here the assertion of the need for contact with the 
“simple” people, the politico-philosophical programme starting 
from Ordine Nuovo and going on to the Notebooks: “the position of 
the philosophy of praxis is the antithesis of the catholic” since “the 
philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave the ‘simple’ in their 
primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a 
higher conception of life”. The aim is “to construct an intellectual-
moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual 
progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups” 
(Q11§12, p. 1384-5; SPN pp. 332-3). 
 
3 [This wording is reused by Gramsci in the argument of Q11§13, SPN p. 424 – trans. note.] 
